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Psychologists usually considered the “Self” as an object of experience appearing when
the individual perceives its existence within the conscious field. In accordance with
such a view, the self-representing capacity of the human mind has been related to
corticolimbic learning processes taking place within individual development. On the
other hand, Carl Gustav Jung considered the Self as the core of our personality, in
its conscious and unconscious aspects, as well as in its actual and potential forms.
According to Jung, the Self originates from an inborn dynamic structure integrating the
essential drives of our “brain–mind,” and leading both to instinctual behavioral actions
and to archetypal psychological experiences. Interestingly, recent neuroethological
studies indicate that our subjective identity rests on ancient neuropsychic processes
that humans share with other animals as part of their inborn constitutional repertoire.
Indeed, brain activity within subcortical midline structures (SCMSs) is intrinsically related
to the emergence of prototypical affective states, that not only influence our behavior
in a flexible way, but alter our conscious field, giving rise to specific feelings or
moods, which constitute the first form of self-orientation in the world. Moreover, such
affective dynamics play a central role in the organization of individual personality and
in the evolution of all other (more sophisticated) psychological functions. Therefore, on
the base of the convergence between contemporary cutting-edge scientific research
and some psychological intuitions of Jung, we intend here to explore the first
neuroevolutional layer of human mind, that we call the affective core of the Self.
Keywords: self, affect, emotion, archetype, consciousness, intentionality, subcortical midline structures (SCMSs),
neurodynamic patterns
“I have long thought that, if there is any analogy between psychic and physiological processes, the
organizing system of the brain must lie subcortically on the brain stem. This conjecture arose out of
considering the psychology of an archetype [the Self] of central importance and universal distribution
represented in mandala symbols. . . . The reason that lead me to conjecture a localization of a
physiological basis for this archetype in the brain stem was the psychological fact that besides being
specifically characterized by the ordering and orienting role, its uniting properties are predominantly
affective. I would conjecture that such a subcortical system might somehow reflect characteristic of the
archetypal form of the unconscious.”
Jung (1958, para. 582).
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INTRODUCTION
In the Western philosophic and scientific tradition, mental
subjective life has been generally considered a prerogative
of human beings that emerges from the activity of highly
evolved and sophisticated neocortical cognitive functions.
These views are sustained by the popular neurocognitive
paradigm that is still deployed to localize subjective feelings
within higher limbic and cortical brain regions (LeDoux,
1996; Rolls, 1999; Kandel, 2005), promoting the belief that
consciousness only emerges from within the thalamocortical
networks (Edelman, 1989; Crick, 1994). In accordance with
such perspectives, psychoanalysts and cognitive psychologists
considered that subjectivity is acquired during human individual
development and derives from the introjection of some
attachment-related operative models resulting in a kind of
reflexive self-perception (Stern, 1985; Schore, 1994; Fonagy,
2001).
A strong version of such corticocognitive anthropocentrism
has been recently re-affirmed by Joseph LeDoux in some
publications (LeDoux, 2015; LeDoux and Brown, 2017). He
considers human subjective experience as the result of higher-
order cortical processes involved in the cognitive interpretations
of our being in the world. The limitation of such a perspective
derives from the erroneous idea that having a subjective
experience necessarily corresponds to the fact of being self-
aware of such an experience, as it can be tested asking “what
do you feel?” to a human person. On the contrary, many
different researchers in the field of psychology, philosophy
and neuroscience have recognized the existence of subjective
experiences without self-awareness, which presumably comes
only as a secondary evolutionary product of our mental life
(James, 1890/1950; Edelman, 1992; Searle, 1992; Damasio,
2010).
In line with the empiricist perspective of James (1890/1950),
the neurophilosopher Georg Northoff defined the “phenomenal
minimal Self ” as the pre-reflexive form of subjectivity that
presupposes an experience, defined by certain (pre)conscious
qualities, or qualia, and the implicit sense of being part
of such experience (Northoff, 2013; Northoff et al., 2014).
Such a definition has the advantage of highlighting the two
necessary and sufficient features of the Self: intentionality
and conscious sensitivity (McGinn, 1989; Searle, 1991).
Intentionality, as a goal-directed organized process, may
be equated to a description of the Self as a dynamic
patterning process unfolding toward a goal. Consciousness
is the process through which the flux of dynamic changes
pervading the Self is accompanied by qualitative phenomenal
experiences.
Empirical human data indicate that the “minimal Self ”
is related to mental imaging and representation processing
that emerge from “resting-state activity” of the CMS (Qin
and Northoff, 2011; Musholt, 2013; Northoff et al., 2014;
Hu et al., 2016; Weiler et al., 2016; LeDoux and Brown, 2017).
Abbreviations : CMSs, cortical midline structures; SCMSs, subcortical midline
structures.
Moreover, the CMS are anatomically and functionally closely
connected with a set of SCMSs (Northoff and Panksepp, 2008;
Panksepp and Northoff, 2009), that have been considered the
neurophysiological substrate of an ancestral form of subjectivity,
named the “Core-Self ” by a member of this research group
(Panksepp, 1998b) and the “proto-Self ” by Damasio (1999).
Interestingly, the SCMS are the most emotional parts of our
brains (perhaps even more than the overemphasized limbic
system), and the affective neurodynamics originating within
the SCMS play a central role in the organization of human
personality (Panksepp, 1998b, 2007; Davis et al., 2003; Northoff
et al., 2006; Davis and Panksepp, 2011; Panksepp and Davis,
2014; Montag et al., 2016). Therefore, as direct expression
of internal modes of functioning —of “intentions-in-action”
(Panksepp, 1998b)—affects may be viewed as the basic organizers
of the Self (Panksepp, 1998a,b, 2005, 2010, 2011; Damasio, 1999;
Denton, 2006), and express a form of rudimentary consciousness
(or proto-consciousness) that is characterized by primary-
process and objectless (anoetic) feelings (Alcaro and Panksepp,
2014).
At the beginning of this article we quoted a passage from Jung
that contains three principal assertions, more or less explicitly
expressed:
(1) Among all other Jungian archetypes1 there is one
(the Self) that has a central importance and universal
distribution and that is represented in highly organized
geometric (and symbolic) “mandalic” patterns (Jung,
1933/1950, 1951) (Figure 1).
(2) If there is any correspondence between the brain and
the psyche, the physiological bases of the Self might be
localized in the brain stem, which is the foundational
organizing system of the whole brain and mind.
(3) Besides its ordering and orienting role, the uniting
properties of the Self are predominantly affective.
Accordingly, we think that such assertions by Jung
were not only quite farsighted, but they actually opens
ways to connect his theory of the psyche with the
most advanced scientific theories and discoveries of our
day.
THE SUBCORTICAL CORE OF THE SELF
Human brain hemispheres are connected to the spinal
cord and to the rest of the body through a set of SCMSs,
whose functional anatomy is approaching maturity at birth
1The best definition of an archetype is an “instinct of imagination,” that is an
inherited disposition to imagine a cluster of representations gravitating around
a characteristic meaning. The correspondences between the concept of archetype
and that of instinct was repeatedly underlined by Jung and his successors (see
Stevens, 2003). From the many descriptions of the archetype, we will quote the
famous footnote in which Jung tries to distinguish between archetype-as-such and
archetypical images: “By this I do not mean the existing form of the motif but
its preconscious, invisible ‘ground plan.’ This might be compared to the crystal
lattice that is preformed in the crystalline solution. It should not be confused with
the variously structured axial system of the individual crystal” (Jung, 1928/1948,
footnote para. 590).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 September 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1424
fpsyg-08-01424 September 1, 2017 Time: 11:46 # 3
Alcaro et al. The Affective Core-Self
FIGURE 1 | An example of Mandala.
(Figure 2). In his pioneering neuroevolutionary contributions,
MacLean (1990) defines SCMS as the “reptilian brain,”
since they are already present in reptiles and are conserved
quite homologous (and not completely unchanged), in a
stratified form, from birds to mammals. Although that
metaphor has received considerable criticism, we envision
that metaphor to mean that it is a “primary process” shared
homologously (but with species-typical variations) by all
vertebrates.
Human and animal studies show that SCMS lesions induce
brain coma and the cessation of any form of psychic and
intentional life: all mental activities collapse and organisms
become zombie-like, exhibiting largely a vegetative existence
without intentionality (Panksepp, 1998a,b; Watt and Pincus,
2004; Merker, 2007; Panksepp and Biven, 2012). Moreover,
deficits get more severe the lower the damage occurs within
the neuroaxis. For example, experimental studies on animals
indicate that the complete destruction of the periaqueductal
gray matter (PAG), which lies at the heart of the SCMSs,
results in the destruction of all self-related processing of
environmental events. With total damage to the PAG, all
world-directed activities are compromised. Animals are
marginally awake, but they do not appear to be conscious of
things in any meaningful way (Panksepp and Biven, 2012,
p. 409).
On the other hand, extensive lesions of the cortical
mantle and higher limbic lobes do not destroy the field
of consciousness For example, animals that have been
neo-decorticated early in life sustain a remarkable level of
behavioral coherence, intentionality and spontaneity. Not only
FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of the Midline Structures of the Brain.
Subcortical midline structures (in blue): Hyp, hypothalamus; IC, inferior
colliculus; LC, locus coeruleus; MT, mediodorsal thalmus; NTS, nucleus
tractus solitaries; PAG, periacqueductal gray; Ra, raphe nuclei; SC, superior
colliculus; VTA, ventral tegmental area. Cortical midline structures (in gray):
DMPFC, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex; MOPFC, medial orbital prefrontal
cortex; MPC, medial parietal cortex; PACC, pre- and subgenual anterior
cingulate cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; RSC, retrosplenial cortex;
SACC, supragenual anterior cingulate cortex; VMPFC, ventral medial
prefrontal cortex.
do they show the ability to learn from positive or negative
reinforced events, but they are actually more emotional
than animal with intact brains (Huston and Borbely, 1973,
1974).
Concordant human evidence is available from a condition
called hydranencephaly, in which cerebral cortex and higher
limbic areas are totally destroyed in utero, which leaves
most subcortical networks functional. Surprisingly, these
hydranencephalic children express many signs of positive and
negative affective states. For example, they:
“[. . .] express pleasure by smiling and laughter, and aversion by
‘fussing’ arching of the back and crying (in many gradations,
their faces being animated by these emotional states). A familiar
adult can employ this responsiveness to build up play sequences
predictably progressing from smiling, through giggling, to
laughter and great excitement on the part of the child” (Merker,
2007, p.79).
Moreover, they also show some forms of affective learning and
memory. They:
“[. . .] take behavioral initiatives within the severe limitations of
their motor disabilities, in the form of instrumental behaviors
such as making noise by kicking trinkets hanging in a special
frame constructed for the purpose (‘little room’), or activating
favorite toys by switches, presumably based upon associative
learning of the connection between actions and their effects. Such
behaviors are accompanied by situationally appropriate signs of
pleasure and excitement on the part of the child” (Merker, 2007).
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In sum, animal and human data demonstrate that a
primal form of Self emerges within SCMS and that all other
sophisticated forms of mental life may depend on those
brain regions, since lesions or disturbances of the SCMS cause
the collapse of any conscious and/or intentional activity. In
spite of the fact that this structure has been called the
“core-Self ” by a member of this research group (Panksepp,
1998b) and “proto-Self ” by Damasio (1999), here we prefer
to adopt the definition of “affective core-Self,” in order to
underline the absolute relevance of the affective dimension.
Indeed, as a consequence of its intrinsic neurophysiology
and neuroanatomical organization, the SCMS are involved
in the emergence of core affective states that have been
differentiated into three categories (Panksepp and Biven,
2012):
(1) Homeostatic/visceral affects refer to internal bodily states
that are perceived at a conscious level in the form of
basic mood and feelings. Indeed, SCMS receive direct
information from the internal body and in turn regulate
visceral and somatic states, controlling the endocrine, the
exocrine and the autonomous nervous systems2 (Damasio,
1996, 1999; Porges, 2011). Due to the strict connection with
the “internal milieu” of the body (Bernard, 1865/1961), the
SCMS have also been called the “visceral brain” (MacLean,
1990).
(2) Instinctual/emotional affects refer to intrinsic and highly
valued dispositions to act, approaching or avoiding
certain situations (see next paragraph). Indeed, SCMS
are already evolutionarily furbished with neural systems
that trigger and control instinctual action patterns and
postures essential for organism survival and reproduction
(such as locomotor and orienting movements, sexual
behaviors, ingestive behaviors, etc.) (Tinbergen, 1951;
Lorenz, 1965; Panksepp, 1998b; Denton, 2006; Arminjon
et al., 2010). Some of such instinctual patterns consist of
basic emotional dispositions, such as fear or rage or joy,
etc. (Panksepp, 1998b) (see next paragraph).
(3) Sensorial affects refer to rudimental perceptual experiences
with an intrinsic affective value, such as the feeling of
touch, the hearing of calming or startling sounds, the
sense of warmth or coldness, sweet or bitter tastes, and
so forth. Indeed, SCMS are provided by some rudimental
sensory way-stations for exteroceptive and proprioceptive
perceptions (Merker, 2007). Interestingly, such subcortical
perceptual areas are closely connected with neural motor
nuclei responsible for directing attention, such as the
superior culliculus and/or the optic tectum that control eye
movements (Stein et al., 2002).
2The endocrine system refers to the collection of glands of an organism that secrete
hormones directly into the circulatory system to be carried toward distant target
organs. Exocrine glands are glands that produce and secrete substances onto an
epithelial surface by way of a duct. Examples of exocrine glands include sweat,
salivary, mammary, ceruminous, lacrimal, sebaceous, and mucous. The autonomic
nervous system (ANS) is a division of the peripheral nervous system that influences
the function of internal organs. The ANS is a control system that acts largely
unconsciously and regulates bodily functions such as the heart rate, digestion,
respiratory rate, pupillary response, urination, and sexual arousal.
EMOTIONAL AFFECTS
Electric brain stimulation studies3 allowed localization within the
SCMS of diverse mammalian Brain Operational Systems whose
activation is responsible for the emergence of at least seven
basic emotional dispositions (Panksepp, 1998a,b, 2005, 2010;
Panksepp and Biven, 2012): the SEEKING System, the RAGE
System, the FEAR System, the LUST System, the CARE System,
the PANIC/Separation distress System and the PLAY System
(Figure 3). Four of such Emotional Systems have been also found
in the brain of reptiles, while perhaps lacking certain (or only
marginally developed) more recently evolved social emotions
(CARE, PANIC/Grief, and PLAY).
Emotional Operational Systems are instinctual neural
devices releasing a series of coordinated and integrated
responses that constitute the characteristic repertoire of
an emotion4. Moreover, animal and human data strongly
support the idea that the activation of each Emotional
System modifies the organism’s subjective state and leads to
characteristic feelings, which are perceived at a conscious or
preconscious level. Indeed, human subjects report intense
emotional feelings during the electric stimulation of the
SCMS (Heath, 1964, 1996); while in animals such stimulations
always induce rewarding or aversive effects that presumably
will influence their behaviors in the future (Panksepp, 2010,
2015).
The (pre)conscious qualities of emotions are intrinsically
related to their intentional character, since positive and
negative affective feelings always reflect the intention to
approach or avoid certain situations, allowing conceptualization
of emotions as primal forms of intentional dispositions.
For example, the SEEKING disposition drives the organism
to forage for essential resources (food, water, sex, etc.),
the FEAR disposition to avoid a source of danger, etc.5.
Therefore, emotions always express a dispositional-intentional
nature that projects the organism into the affordances of
the world, thereby defining an animal’s key affective attitudes
and, in conjunction with the cortical networks, scopes of
behavioral strategies. This teleological view, fundamental also
in Jung’s model of the psyche, considers emotional affects
as autoperceptions of internal modes of functioning – of
“intentions-in-action” (Panksepp, 1998b) – expressing a form of
3Electric brain stimulation is an experimental technique that is generally used
in animal studies, but that has been also utilized in humans (Heath, 1996). The
insertion of a microelectrode in a specific brain site permits electric impulses to
be sent that stimulate neural assemblies and circuits. Behavioral responses to such
stimulations are observed in animals, while in humans is also possible to ask what
is going on during the period of stimulation.
4For example, the Rage System activates the sympathetic nervous system and a
sequences of movements and postures that serve to attack and defend and that
have also acquired a communicative meaning.
5From a Darwinian point of view, each emotional disposition serves a specific
role in terms of organism survival and/or reproduction. However, the immediate
adaptive function of each emotion does not exhaust the ensemble of possibilities
opened up by its expression. For example, the SEEKING disposition also drives
animals to explore novel environments or contexts, and sustains creativity in
pushing to search for novel solutions. Therefore, we may look at emotions as very
general attitudes whose adaptive function constitutes a specification that natural
selection crystallized during biological evolution.
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FIGURE 3 | List of the Basic Emotional Systems with their neuroanatomy and neurochemistry. Red color refers to positive-appetitive emotional dispositions, while
the blue color refers to negative-aversive emotional dispositions. Ach, achetilcholine; alpha-MSH, alpha-melanocyte stimulating hormone; BNST (bed nucleus of the
stria terminalis); CCK, cholecystokinin; CRF, corticotropin releasing factor; DA, dopamine; DBI, diazepam binding inhibitor; LH-RH, luteinizing hormone-releasing
hormone; NPY, neuropeptide Y; PAG, periacqueductal gray; TRH, thyrotropin-releasing hormone; VTA, ventral tegmental area.
“anoetic” consciousness, which is the first primal layer of the
brain in which the core-Self affectively experiences its own sense
of itself 6.
In line with recent non-linear dynamic theories (Freeman,
1999; Brown, 2002; Llinas, 2002), emotional affects may
be more properly identified with neurodynamic patterns
that emerge within SCMS and then all along the brain
and body, exerting an attraction over the organism’s
activity and driving it toward specific “basins” of neuronal
activation (see also Panksepp, 2000; Krieger, 2014). In
such a way, emotional affects act as vectors that orient
the ensemble of behavioral and mental activities toward
specific directions and orbits of meaning. While being
transmitted toward the spinal cord and other motor or
visceral effector systems, they become integrated ensembles
of physiologic and behavioral instinctual responses. In
diffusing toward higher brain areas, they can take the form
of ensembles of mental representations (archetypal images or
6Strictly speaking, this is not yet a representation (a vorstellung), it is a presentation
(a darstellung) generated, in Jungian terms, by one of the five basic human
“instincts”: reflectivity (Jung, 1937/1942) applied to the psychoid patterning
process (which we may describe as analogous to the neural networks).
thoughts), gravitating around a characteristic affective core
(Figure 4).
When neurodynamic patterns evolve in a rigid and automatic
way, they give rise to stereotyped behavioral or mental actions
that are characterized by compulsiveness and act on the subjective
world as external factors, or to use a Jungian terminology, as
“ectopsychic factors”:
“Among the psychological factors determining human behavior,
the instincts are the chief motivating forces of psychic events.
[. . .] if we look upon the appearance of the psyche as a relatively
recent event in evolutionary history, and assume that the psychic
function is a phenomenon accompanying a nervous system which
in some way or another has become centralized, then it would
be difficult to believe that the instincts were originally psychic in
nature. And since the connection of the psyche with the brain
is a more probable conjecture than the psychic nature of life in
general, I regard the characteristic compulsiveness of the instinct
as an ectopsychic7 factor. None the less, it is psychologically
7This means that the psychic characteristic of an instinct is an emergent quality
of an originally not-psychic compulsive/automatic urge/pattern (such as that of an
insect) that could activate the organism. This urge/pattern is wholly ectopsychic,
as it originates not just outside the organism (the “outer” world), but outside the
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FIGURE 4 | Schematic illustration of the ascending and the descending ways
where core affective neurodynamic states originating within SCMS are
transmitted.
important because it leads to the formation of structures or
patterns which may be regarded as determinants of the human
behavior” (Jung, 1937/1942, para. 234).
However, emotional dispositions differ from rigid behavioral
automatisms, since the ensemble of actions coordinated
by each Emotional System is organized and modulated in
a flexible way. As a consequence of that, emotions have
been conceptualized as “flexible action patterns” (Llinas,
2002) which respond to trigger stimuli, but also anticipate
future events, prepare the organism to cope with uncertain
situations and with sufficient neocortex, to orient its
attitude toward specific intentional routes. The intrinsic
non-deterministic quality of emotional dispositional patterns
opens the material/organic structure to the entrance of a psychic
intentional/conscious germ (Bergson, 1896/1991). As underlined
by Jung:
“[. . .] the immediate determining factor is not the ectoplastic
instinct but the structure resulting from the interaction of instinct
and the psychic situation of the moment. The determining factor
would thus be a modified instinct. The change undergone by
the instinct is as significant as the difference between the color
we see and the objective wave-length producing it. Instinct as
an ectopsychic factor would play the role of a stimulus merely,
while instinct as a psychic phenomenon would be an assimilation
psyche, at a wholly physiological level. With the evolution of a centralized nervous
system, this ectopsychic urge/pattern is modified by the nervous system and, so
modified, becomes “psychicized,” i.e., it becomes the function of the interaction
between the ectopsychic stimulus and the “inner” nervous system that processes
it. Such an interaction is strictly connected to Jung’s four functions that organize
consciousness, as they may be directed toward ectopsychic inputs (in extroversion)
or endopsychic stimuli (in introversion).
of this stimulus to a pre-existing pattern. A name is needed for
this process. I should term it psychicization8” (Jung, 1937/1942,
para. 234).
CORE AFFECTS AS ARCHETYPAL
“PSYCHOID” STATES AND THE
DUAL-ASPECT MONISM
At the current historical moment, scientific research is not
able to explain how SCMS neurodynamic activity is related to
the emergence of core affective states, that are experienced at
the subjective level (consciousness) and that may teleologically
influence the course of material events (intentionality) (Jonas,
1976; Searle, 1992). This difficulty probably arises when subjective
states (first-person experiences) are reductionistically derived
from objective material processes (third-person events), in the
erroneous attempt to restrict an intensive and non-localizable
phenomenon within a three-dimensional spatial field (Bergson,
1896/1991).
A very influential empirically oriented philosophic tradition
considers affective feeling as intrinsically related to the perception
of internal visceral and bodily states, a kind of integrated
enteroception. The most famous theory within this perspective
was advanced independently by James (1884) and Lange
(1887). They suggested that affective feelings reflect cortical-
cognitive representation of peripheral-unconscious arousal
activated within the body by certain instinctual/emotional
devices. Recently, Antonio Damasio proposed a new version of
the James-Lange theory, correcting its original cortico-centrism
and suggesting that the SCMS are involved in a first-step
representation of somatic and visceral states (Damasio, 1996,
1999, 2010).
Damasio’s conception has illustrious antecedents in the
history of psychoanalysis. Indeed, considering affects as states of
visceral tension and relaxation, Freud wrote:
“The Id, cut off from the external world, has a world of perception
of its own. It detects with extraordinary acuteness certain changes
in its interior, especially oscillations in the tension of its instinctual
needs, and these changes become conscious as feelings in the
pleasure-unpleasure series” (Freud, 1940/1964, p. 190).
The Freudian visceral view has been recently taken again
by neuro-psychoanalists, who postulate a strict correspondence
between the internal physiologic environment and the mental
world of the subjects (Solms and Turnbull, 2002). In such
a perspective, affective feelings are linked to the process of
homeostasis (Cannon, 1929; Denton, 2006), and then to the
messages of survival and reproductive success or failure that the
8If we apply those considerations to affective neuroscientific evidence, it seems
reasonable to imagine that the “psychic situation of the moment” should somehow
find a physical (i.e., something that belongs to physics) correspondence within a
continuous flow of SCMS neurodynamic activity that presents some essential bio-
physic character associated with subjective conscious states (Edelman and Tononi,
2000). When Emotional Systems are activated, they release an ensemble of neural,
visceral, and motor patterns that reverberate within the SCMS and interact with
pre-existing neurodynamic patterns, giving rise to a “modified instinct” which
expresses a “psychicization” (or “subjectification”) factor.
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body sends to the brain–mind. Moreover, recent developments
within the neuropsychoanalytic homeostatic perspective has
also suggested that embodied interactions with other people in
childhood permit the “mentalization” of basic visceral sensations,
transforming rough internal perceptions into subjective feelings
(Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017).
However, the physiological connection of SCMS with the
organism’s internal and external environment does not imply
that affective feelings simply originate from neurocognitive
representations of visceral and somatic functions: for instance,
reflecting about the nature of affects, Freud himself affirmed that
he was skeptical that:
“With this enumeration we have arrived at the essence of an affect.
We seem to see deeper in the case of some affects and to recognize
that the core [. . .] is the repetition of some particular significant
experience. This experience could only be a very early impression of
a very general nature, placed in the prehistory not of the individual
but of the species” (Freud, [28], p. 395).
In this highly significant passage, Freud abandoned his
traditional reductionist perspective to embrace a Lamarkian and
anti-reductionist approach9. According to him, the intrinsic core
of an affect is not just a somatic material process, but a psychic
event (“a very early impression of a very general nature, placed
in the prehistory not of the individual but of the species”).
Therefore, the reductionist stand must not exclude the more
encompassing, non-reductive paradigm that Jung constantly
developed in his writings. Perhaps, the best example of this
double vision – reductive and non-reductive – may be found in
the essay “On the nature of the psyche” (Jung, 1947/1954), where
he takes into account both biological components (for instance
the instinctual “patterns of behavior” in animals and man), and
their relationship to non-causal principles related to subatomic
physics.
This issue leads us directly to touch upon a philosophic
position known as “dual-aspect monism” adopted first by
Spinoza (see Ravven, 2013) as well as by Jung and Pauli many
years ago (Atmanspacher, 2012), and recently re-proposed by
9It seems then that Freud and Jung, along with the many other scientists of their
time, supported a mixed Darwinian/Lamarkian evolutionary paradigm, although
in Jung’s views the role of random changes (e.g., mutations) was considered a weak
construct not just in regard to evolutionary concerns, but especially, and more
radically, as a foundational epistemological principle. Thus, in Jung’s thought, the
Lamarkian perspective seems to be much more central than in Freud’s; as, for Jung,
all complex systems (“nature”) develop following not only a evolutionary causal
push, but also, and especially, a virtual teleological pull. And if one admits an
evolutionary virtual attractor – a goal – the question whether such a goal may be
irrational, may become an urgent concern for the generation of a decisive formal
hypothesis. For Kauffman (1993) if evolutionary bifurcations and migrations
of populations had to follow pure Darwinian chance, few emerging specialized
phenotype would actually survive, but undergo extinction, as the mathematical
model of such a purely Darwinian evolutionary pattern would cause what
Kauffman calls catastrophe of complexity. This term describes the real outcome
of such an evolutionary model based on pure chance: the “regression” of the more
specialized species to some modal average as opposed to their stabilization at an
evolutionary peak. For Kauffman, in order for evolution to maintain its peaks,
as reached by the more adaptive species, one needs to assume a self-regulating
emerging organizational order intrinsic to every non-linear complex system (such
as a living organism). In our opinion, such self-organizing order represents another
example of a virtual teleological factor within an evolutionary process (see also,
Tagliagambe and Malinconico, 2011).
Mark Solms and other neuro-psychoanalysts (Kaplan-Solms and
Solms, 2000). According to such a view, the material and the
subjective worlds are two complementary manifestations of a
unique, albeit perhaps unknowable unitary reality, to which Jung
refers with the concept of “psychoid.” The presence of such
underlying dimension has been widely underlined in Eastern
cultural tradition, as well in some Western philosopher, such
as A.N. Withehead (1929). In the 20th century, its existence
was revealed by the study of quanto-mechanic processes in
physics, and of unconscious processes in analytical psychology10.
Both disciplines recognized the influence of unobservable
(paradoxical) phenomena within the normal flow of observable
material and mental events.
Today, the application of non-linear dynamic theories
to neuroscience (Freeman, 1999; Brown, 2002; Llinas, 2002;
Krieger, 2014), shifting the level of neurological analysis
from a material-neurochemical level to an immaterial-
electrical field level, theoretically opens the way to shift
from the physics of massive bodies to quantum physics,
and, therefore, to the level of reality in which synchronistic
phenomena may be rationally admissible11 (Jung, 1955;
Bohm, 1980/1981; Penrose, 1989; Brown, 2002). For example,
the neurologist Brown (2002), who integrated the process
philosophy of Whitehead with the most recent discoveries of
neuroscience, looks at the Self as the microgentic oscillatory
quantistic process that emerges within the brain from the
depth (subcortical) to the surface (cortical), giving rise to
moments of consciousness, that gradually evolve from pure
arousal without objects to complex representations and
self-representation12.
In line with such speculative hypotheses, we may represent
core affects as “archetypes-as-such,” primal organized
configurations of intrinsically evaluative events that reveal
themselves both in brain-behavioral action/dispositional
patterns (objective domain) as well as in intense affective feelings
(subjective domain). Such archetypal psychoid events presumably
correspond, at a physical descriptive level, to a dynamic
structure of global-field quantistic microwaves reverberating
10In a letter to Rosenfeld of April 1, 1952 (p. 593), Pauli writes: “For the invisible
reality, of which we have small pieces of evidence in both quantum physics and
the psychology of the unconscious, a symbolic psychophysical unitary language
must ultimately be adequate, and this is the distant goal to which I actually aspire.”
Meyenn, K. von (Edn 1996): Wolfgang Pauli. Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, Band
IV, Teil I: 1950/1952, Berlin: Springer.
11Besides the work by Llinas and Freeman, which we already briefly noted, we
would also like to recall Eccles’s (1994) observation that the number of molecules
exchanged through the synaptic membrane is so small that it should not follow the
statistical behavior of massive bodies, but that of quantistic entities, which would,
in his opinion, support his and Karl Popper’s theory of a mind that can actually
initiate various activities of the brain.
12In the last 10 years, accumulating scientific evidences indicate that global-field
quantistic microdynamic states, which have not yet encountered a collapse in their
wave functions, may influence the behavior of animals and other living organisms
(McFadden and Al-Khalili, 2014). The sensitivity that biological organisms show
for non-local quantistic oscillations confirm the speculative hypotheses formulated
by the pioneers of quantum physics, that tried to give a new scientific status
to concepts like “soul,” or “psyche,” or “life” (Schrödinger, 1944; Heisenberg,
1958/2000). Interestingly, it has also been suggested that the affective dimension
is the most direct manifestation of a pervasive quantistic field which influence
animal’s behavior from within (Simondon, 1989/2007).
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within SCMS13 (see Brown, 2002). In amplifying quantistic
microwaves (Penrose, 1989; Brown, 2002), the brain may be
more properly viewed as a transformer station, connecting mind
and matter, and actualizing psychological processes within a
linear spatio-temporal dimension. As suggested by Jung:
“One might assume the psyche gradually rising from minute
extensity to infinite intensity, transcending for instance the
velocity of light and thus irrealizing the body. [. . .] In the
light of this view the brain might be a transformer station,
in which the relatively infinite tension or intensity of the
psyche proper is transformed into perceptible frequencies or
“extensions.” Conversely, the fading of introspective perception
of the body explains itself as due to a gradual “psychification,” i.e.,
intensification at the expense of extension.
Psyche = highest intensity in the smallest space.
UNEXTENDED INTENSITY14”
(C.G. Jung∼Carl Jung, Letters Vol. II, PP 43–47).
AFFECTS AS THE PRIMAL ORGANIZERS
OF THE SUBJECTIVE LIFE
Recent neuroscientific formulations affirm that affectivity is
the primordial form of subjectivity. More specifically, it has
been recognized that affects express an enlarged, diffused and
primary-process sensitivity devoid of any specific content
or clear cognitive distinction between the external-objective
and the internal-subjective world. Such primary-process
and objectless sensitivity has also been called “anoetic”
consciousness (or protoconsciousness) an “[. . .] unthinking
form of experience, which may be affectively intense without
being known” (Solms and Panksepp, 2012, p. 149)15. It is
“the rudimentary state of autonomic awareness [. . .], with
a fundamental form of first-person ‘self-experience’ which
relies on affective experiential states and raw sensory and
perceptual mental existences” (Vandekerckhove and Panksepp,
2009, p. 1). Within this context, anoetic proto-conscious
feelings emerge as neurodynamic “wave’s crest” from a
continuous flux of diffuse arousal without focus or intent
(mood)16.
13Their action has been evolutionarily impressed into the organisms and may be
elicited by certain neural devices that have been conserved due to their adaptive
value. When brain affective systems are stimulated, they activate highly sensitive
neuro-physiologic states that may resonate with the quantic spatio-temporal
vectors of core affects and with their subjective complementary qualities.
14In light of the uncanny epistemic nature of the human mind, basically rooted
in its ability to think natural numbers, the possibility that nature is trying to
converge toward not survival but knowledge (the Greek “gnosis”) does not seem
at all obsolete (but is perhaps ontologically obscure). In any event, it is precisely
under this perspective that the very ultimate function of the brain (and therefore
the body) may be re-thought in less neuro-reductionist and more encompassing
psychological terms. Jung’s very far-fetched hypothesis quoted above is just such a
speculative hypothesis.
15In the clinical situation, these feelings remind us of Christopher Bollas’
description of the mood that belongs to what he calls the “unthought known,”
and which he directly refers to the primary pre-objectual relationship with the
“environmental mother” (Bollas, 1987).
16Lacking any boundaries or subject/object differentiation, affects tend to be
projected into the external world, coloring objects of perception by specific affective
tonalities and intrinsic intentional aims (projection). This kind of projective
As a matter of fact, affectivity was considered to be the
fundamental feature of the brain–mind by many early pioneers,
including John Hughlings Jackson, and also Eugen Bleuler, one
of the most important partners of Jung’s scientific career. Here, is
what Bleuler wrote in his seminal work on psychosis:
“[. . .] the little child has a fully developed affectivity; all the affects
present in the adult are wholly developed in him. On the contrary,
the child’s intelligence is void of contents and the logical processes
are relatively poor” (Bleuler, 1906/1912, p. 24, our translation).
Also Jung, from the very beginning – i.e., from his Association
studies (Jung, 1904/1905) – gave an absolute relevance to affects
and affective feelings for subjective mental life, as underlined in
the following passage:
“Every psychic process has a value quality attached to it, namely
its feeling-tone. This indicates the degree to which the subject is
affected by the process or how much it means to him (in so far as
the process reaches consciousness at all). It is through the ‘affect’
that the subject becomes involved and so comes to feel the whole
weight of reality” (Jung, 1959/1978, para. 61).
Therefore, Jung considered affects as forces that attract the
subject and that are experienced in the form of characteristic
feelings. In this sense, Jung (1928/1948) substituted Freud’s
theory of the impulse (the drive) with a much more cogent
theory of a binding field-force (in psychological terms, the
affect) which polarizes and confers value on patterns, or psychic
representations.
Therefore, affects may be viewed as transpersonal forms of
experience pervading a primal subjective field, that is not yet
individually conscious (or self-conscious), since it lives within an
undifferentiated organism/environment continuum. At the same
time, affects are the bridge between the collective mind and the
individual mind, between the instinctual inheritance of the specie
and the personal experiences accumulated within the individual
life. As described by member of this research group:
“By providing a shared neural platform for diverse affective
experience, the core Self can be considered a nomothetic
(universal) brain function. As the core Self, along with the
many raw feelings it elaborates, interact with higher cognitive
[. . .] processes, it promote the emergence of various ideographic
(individually unique, experientially refined) extended selves,
during development brain maturation” (Panksepp and Biven,
2012, p. 392).
Although affects are originally objectless experiences,
they provide the field whereby all incoming perceptual
stimuli/experiences are integrated into a single conscious
and intentional state. Moreover, affective states exert a powerful
modulation over every form of individual learning and
associative memory (learning modulation property) (Panksepp
and Biven, 2012; Vandekerckhove et al., 2014). Thereby, all
personal experiences that are accumulated during individual
attitude may at times create a strict synthesis (or overlapping) between affects and
external objects, so the object is perceived to be carrying an affective value of its
own. For example, when we are under the influence of our intrinsic affectiv e selves,
we often do not recognize that we are loving or hating a person, but feel instead that
such a person is lovable or hateful.
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history take the form of clusters (or complexes) of perceptual
memory traces gravitating around an affect. This is precisely
the idea developed by Jung (1960) with the concept of “feeling-
toned complexes,” which he considered the psychological
structures that gather together different mental contents and
representations on the base of a common affective state17.
Each complex is united by the same emotion, which define
its core of meaning, and organizes experience, perception,
and affect around a constant central theme. For example, the
complex of inferiority is a constellation of memories, thoughts
and phantasies related to the lack of self-worth, a doubt and
uncertainty about oneself, and feelings of not measuring up to
standards.
There, speaking of the complex, Jung wrote: “the constellating
power of its nuclear element corresponds to its value intensity,
i.e., to its energy” (Jung, 1928/1948, §19, Jung’s italics). Along
these lines, he also wrote: “It would be an unpardonable
sin of omission were we to overlook the feeling-value of the
archetype. This is extremely important both theoretically and
therapeutically” [CW 8, para. 411], since the archetype is a “[. . .]
living system of reactions and aptitudes” connected with the
living individual “[. . .] by the bridge of emotion” [CW 18, para.
589].
The Jungian theory of the feeling-toned complexes is an
elaboration of the work of Pierre Janet on the autonomous
fixed ideas. According to Janet (1889), fixed ideas are
mental images or thoughts that have a high emotional
charge and take on exaggerated proportions, so they may
not be normally integrated within the ego-consciousness
and become isolated from the habitual personality, creating
dissociated states of the mind (Monahan, 2009). However,
in contrast with the original theory of Janet, Jung sustained
that the dissociative aspect of complexes is usually reversible,
so they may be much or more integrated according to the
momentary situation. Only in severe mental pathologies,
such as psychoses, certain complexes are permanently
dissociated from the conscious ego and the personality becomes
fragmented.
A MULTILAYERED NEURO-EVOLUTIVE
ARCHITECTURE OF THE SELF
Many authors had hypothesized that the Self is not a
unitary phenomenon and that it may be differentiated in
overlapping layers that have been stratified in evolution
(James, 1890/1950). The use of an archeological metaphor
to describe the human mind has been widely used by
psychoanalysts. For example, Sigmund Freud looked at the
psyche as an ancient town, like Rome, where the passage
of time has been impressed into a monumental stratification
that goes from antiquity to the modern era. The exploration
17As an affective organizer, the “complex” is a Gestalt, or, in contemporary
language, an example of a “dynamic system.” A strong support for this view may be
found in Paul Weiss’ biological models of non-linear complex systems to describe
the intrinsic organization of all living ”systems” and its application in psychology
by Sander (2007) and the so-called Boston group.
of the multilayered organization of the human mind has
been empirically enriched by contributions coming from the
neurosciences. John Hughlings Jackson, the father of English
neurology, was probably the first neurophysiologist offering an
explicit hierarchical description of brain functioning (see Franz
and Gillett, 2011), and his interesting intuitions were further
developed by Lurija (1962). Moreover, integrating human and
animal neuroanatomic perspectives, MacLean (1990) gave an
essential neuroevolutionary view to modern neuroscience (albeit,
not without abundant debate – for overview, see, Panksepp,
2002). He conceptualized three overlapping layers in the human
brain: the neocortical-rational brain, characteristic of our species,
an intermediate limbic-emotional brain, characteristic of all
mammals, and the visceral-instinctual brain, characteristic of
reptiles—a pattern that is more or less conserved across
vertebrates18.
However, in contrast to dominant anthropocentric
perspective, accumulating neuroscientific evidence affirms
that a primordial form of subjectivity is already present at the
first level of the brain hierarchy (the reptilian-paleomammalian
instinctual brain) and that it is widely diffused across mammals,
birds, and perhaps other vertebrates (Panksepp, 1998b, 2016;
Seth et al., 2005; Northoff and Panksepp, 2008; Edelman and
Seth, 2009; Panksepp and Northoff, 2009; Revonsuo, 2010;
Ward, 2011; Panksepp and Biven, 2012; Fabbro et al., 2015;
Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016). The accruing evidence led a
member of this research group to introduce some cardinal
changes into the tripartite neuroevolutionary model of Paul
Maclean19 (Panksepp, 1998b, 2011; Panksepp and Biven, 2012),
and to coax the contemporary neuro-psychoanalytic movement
to consider the reality of an affective (if not cognitively
reflective) “conscious Id”20 (Solms and Panksepp, 2012; Solms,
2013).
In accordance with such hypotheses, it has been recently
proposed that the phenomenon of consciousness may be
differentiated into anoetic, noetic and autonoetic states, that
18The neuroevolutionary layers of Paul Maclean (which has antecedents going back
to Hughlings Jackson shows some correspondence with the tripartite organization
of the psychic apparatus described by Sigmund Freud. Indeed, the subcortical
reptilian brain may be equated to the Id, since it is the seat of instinctual
needs (drives) that sends ascending reticular projections that modulate forebrain
arousal states (Moruzzi and Magoun, 1949). On the other side, the Ego and the
SuperEgo may be related to certain neuro-functional processes located within the
upper limbic and neocortical regions, where interiorized object-relationships exert
an inhibitory control over spontaneous drive’s expression (Carhart-Harris and
Friston, 2010; Solms and Panksepp, 2012).
19As in MacLean’s view, also for Panksepp the topmost and most recent layer
is the neo-cortical brain, responsible for sophisticated cognitive functions, such
as language and self-awareness. However, in Panksepp’s perspective, the second
layer of the MacLean schema, the limbic brain, is mainly involved in emotional
learning and higher regulatory processes, instead of in unconditional emotion
generation and expression. Moreover, the most ancient and deep part of the brain,
that MacLean indicated as the reptilian brain, is responsible not only for basic
instinctual and homeostatic processes, but also for the emergence of primary-
process, basic primordial emotions, with their characteristic affective feelings
(which are further elaborated by the higher brain levels).
20Despite the importance attributed to inherited instinctual dispositions shared by
all vertebrate animals, it is noteworthy that Freud excluded that the possibility
that the instinctual “Id” might have any kind of psychological attributes, such as
intentionality or consciousness, that may be essential to integrate the ensembles of
higher brain functions into coherent subjective states.
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correspond to different layers of the neuro-psychic architecture
(Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2009, 2011).
Anoetic consciousness (already described in the previous
paragraphs) is the first primal layer of the Self21, an ancient
neuroevolutionary product whose existence is widely
diffused across animal species, extending from mammals
to birds and reptiles, and probably to vertebrates in
general (Fabbro et al., 2015; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016).
Moreover, newborns come into the world with an inherited
ability to experience anoetic states as the result of the
activity of subcortical brain areas already functionally
mature at birth (Merker, 2007), as we described within this
article.
On the other hand, noetic and autonoetic consciousness
are more recent evolutionary functions of the superior
cortical and limbic areas of the brain and require some
form of individual learning to be adequately developed and
expressed.
Noetic consciousness reflects knowledge-based experiences
that arise when refined attentional capacities permit a clear
distinction and categorization of specific features of the
environment which, with enough neo-cortex, allows animals
to think ahead. Indeed, when specific aspects of events
become the focus of attention, explicit object-related reflective
awareness comes into the fore while semantic (conceptual)
memory helps to analyze and categorize the situation (Tulving,
1985). This is the form of consciousness that Edelman
called “primary consciousness,” and that he related to the
activity of re-entrant thalamo-cortical brain circuitries (Edelman,
1989). Indirect evidence suggest that noetic consciousness is
present across mammals, birds, and perhaps also in reptiles
(Edelman et al., 2005), and that human babies, born very
immature, start to manifest it after the third month of
development.
A further step in the neuro-psychic evolution is accomplished
through the acquisition of language (Hauser et al., 2002;
Gazzaniga, 2011) and of the ability to mentally travel in time
(Corballis, 2012), making possible not only the conscious
recall of past events (episodic memory), but also to imagine
future events including one’s own death (Tulving, 2002).
This narrative structure of the Self, which presumably
appeared more than 1 million years ago, most clearly
(for us) in the genus Homo habilis, gives rise to the most
sophisticated, self-awareness based, autonoetic consciousness,
that Edelman has described as “secondary consciousness”
(Edelman, 1992). Interestingly, autonoetic consciousness
seems heavily related to the so-called “theory of mind”
(the ability to imagine what’s going on the mind of other
individuals), which seems to be a chiefy human feature
(Corballis, 2012).
The passage from the affective core Self (anoetic
consciousness) to higher stages of Self-evolution (noetic and
21Strictly speaking, this form of consciousness is not is not yet based a
representation (a vorstellung), it is a presentation (a darstellung) generated, in
Jungian terms, by one of the five basic human “instincts”: reflectivity (Jung,
1937/1942) applied to the psychoid patterning process (which we may describe as
analogous to the neural networks).
autonoetic consciousness) is an evolutionary leap that humans
achieved; a leap that has been long prepared by antecedent
evolutionary processes in other mammals, perhaps birds, and
other creatures, as well. In future contributions, we will explore
and describe such evolutionary progressions, as well as the new
creative potential opened up by the acquisition of cognitive
reflexive abilities22. Here, we have focused on the most basic
foundations of our being–the affective substrates from which all
our higher psychological functions derive. These initial layers of
our minds, provide an essential foundation for all subsequent
higher-order psychoneurological functions that make human
minds unique.
CONCLUSION
Although dominant neurocognitive paradigms typically co-
locate subjective life to the highest levels of the brain
organization, primarily as the consequence of accumulating
individual memories that are stored within neuroplastic forebrain
circuits, a large amount of neuro-ethological evidence shows
that non-human animals (mammals, birds, and perhaps also
other vertebrates) also have forms of subjectivity that emerge
from the activity of old evolutionary subcortical brainstem,
diencephalic, and basal forebrain areas (Panksepp, 1998b, 2015,
2016; Seth et al., 2005; Edelman and Seth, 2009; Revonsuo, 2010;
Ward, 2011; Panksepp and Biven, 2012; Fabbro et al., 2015).
These findings clearly indicate that subjectivity is an inherited
disposition routed on the instinctual archaic action-foundations
of our brain (Goodwyn, 2010), and they confirm Jung’s view that
before reflexive self-consciousness is developmentally acquired
by infants, a primordial-instinctual affective form of Self already
exists, expressing itself in the form of a affective-psychic
intentionality that can interact effectively, in an evaluative way,
with the material, deterministic world.
In his famous autobiography (Jung, 1962/1963), Carl G. Jung
reported a personal dream that he considered the most important
revelation about the structure of the psyche:
“I was in a house I did not know, which had two storys. It was ‘my
house.’ I found myself in the upper story, where there was a kind of
salon furnished with fine old pieces in rococo style. On the walls
hung a number of precious old paintings. I wondered that this
should be my house, and thought, ‘Not bad.’ But then itoccurred
to me that I did not know what the lower floor looked like.
Descending the stairs, I reached the ground floor. There
everything was much older. I released that this part of the
house must date from about the 15th or the 16th century.
The furnishings were medieval, the floors were of red brick.
Everywhere it was rather dark. I went from one room to another
thinking “now I really must explore the whole house.” I came
upon a heavy door and opened it. Beyond it, I discovered a stone
stairway that led down into a cellar.
22This leap, a second evolutionary step that we will discuss in a second article,
is based on the fundamental process of self-reflectivity [one of Jung basic five
“instincts” (Jung, 1937/1942)] of a pattern into an image. It is intrinsically
connected to dreaming and, as already noted by Jouvet (1975), may be regarded
as the self-representation of the psyche updating its strategy for survival, starting
from its ancestral ectodermic (cold-blooded) repertoire of its reptilian past.
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Descending again I found myself in a beautifully vaulted
room which looked exceedingly ancient. Examining the walls, I
discovered layers of brick among the ordinary stone blocks, and
chips of brick in the mortar. As soon as I saw this I knew that the
walls dated from Roman times. My interest by now was intense. I
looked more closely at the floor. It was of stone labs and in one of
these I discovered a ring. When I pulled it the stone slab lifted and
again I saw a stairway of narrow stone steps leading down into the
depths.
These, too, I descended, and entered a low cave cut into
the rock. Thick dust lay on the floor, and in the dust
were scattered bones and broken pottery, like remains of a
primitive culture. I discovered two human skulls, obviously very
old and half disintegrated. Then I awoke” (Jung, 1962/1963,
p. 155).
Such a dream is another example of how the psyche may be
composed of multiple neural strata where more superficial and
recent layers have been built upon the older ones during the
natural (and cultural) history of our species. In thinking about
the meaning of the deepest and primordial layer, the cave, Jung
wrote that:
“[Here] we reach the naked bed-rock, and with it that prehistoric
time when reindeer hunters fought for a bare and wretched
existence against the elemental forces of wild nature. The men
of that age were still in full possession of their animal instincts,
without which life would have been impossible” (63, par. 55).
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